Abstract
I. INTRODUCTION
It is often said that English law recognises only "institutional" constructive trusts, and does not impose "remedial" constructive trusts. Whatever the position in other Commonwealth jurisdictions, many English jurists perceive the imposition of trusts which reflect the "critical features of judicial discretion and retrospectivity" 1 as manifestly inappropriate and fundamentally unjustified. The fervency with which this view is often asserted gives the impression that "institutional" and "remedial" constructive trusts have non-contentious, well-settled meanings. However, upon close inspection, "many judges and jurists have used the expression 'institutional' without explaining its import, while those who have paused to clarify the matter have tended to use the term in quite different ways". 2 And in relation to remedial constructive trusts, little time has been spent to account for the different degrees and dimensions of discretion, or to investigate whether the timing at which a constructive trust takes effect necessarily determines its nature.
This paper observes the definitional deficiencies in the present understanding of "institutional" and "remedial" constructive trusts, and reanalyses constructive trusts in terms of the rights which they give effect to. In the light of this understanding, the status of English law and the credibility of the antagonistic attitude will be revisited. It will be seen that English law sets its face against the exercise of discretion in relation only to established or elucidated rules and requirements", 14 their imposition would reflect the absence of a "rationale for the availability of proprietary remedies". 15 In terms of timing, the perceived relevance of discretion means that remedial constructive trusts necessarily exist for the first time when they are imposed by the court. 16 The effects of the trusts are also said to be within the discretion of the court. Thus, judges have latitude to decide whether the proprietary consequences take effect retrospectively or prospectively. 17 
B. Deficiencies
Upon close scrutiny, these definitions do not fully account for the distinction between institutional and remedial constructive trusts, and fail accurately to reflect the true state of the law.
Take first the element of discretion. It is difficult to accept the proposition that the exercise of judicial discretion necessarily entails that constructive trusts do not have proprietary effect from the occurrence of certain facts. Nor is it necessarily the case that the exercise of such discretion indicates the lack of settled principles and proper rationales. As Etherton J (as he then was) observed in London Allied Holdings Ltd. v Lee, 18 such a view of judicial discretion may be "overly emphatic, having regard, for example, to the strong discretion in the Court to decide upon the appropriate form of relief for proprietary estoppel, including whether it should be personal or proprietary and whether it should be to protect the claimant's expectations or compensate for reliance loss." A claimant (A) in proprietary estoppel obtains an "equity by estoppel" 19 when B induces A to assume that B will cede an interest in property B owns to A, and A relies on the assumption to A's detriment. This indicates that proprietary estoppel undoubtedly gives effect to A's right born of facts which have happened outside the court. Moreover, the remedial discretion cannot be exercised simply based on whether it is "just" to do so on the facts of a particular case, but must reflect settled and established principles. Thus, the remedy must be proportionate, and courts must impose only the "minimum equity" to do justice 20 to compensate A for his detrimental reliance. 21 Where a constructive trust is awarded, its proprietary consequences "ha [ve] effect from the time the equity arises" (that is, from the occurrence of the relevant facts) "as an interest capable of binding successors in title." 22 The source of the difficulty lies in the manifest unsuitability of using discretion per se as a distinguishing criterion. In a different context, it has been said that "'discretion' is a somewhat protean word. It connotes the exercise of judgment in making choices. In a sense, most decisions involve the exercise of discretion … [T]here can also be discretion even in the hammering of a nail". 23 Discretion is not a binary, all-or-nothing concept; there are different degrees and shades to it. It is therefore impossible properly to define institutional and remedial constructive trusts merely in terms of whether discretion is or 14 is not exercised.
The element of timing also fares no better. In the first place, it is not an essential characteristic of remedial constructive trusts that it gives judges the ability to determine on a case-by-case basis the timing at which proprietary effects first arise. For instance, the Canadian Supreme Court in Rawluk v Rawluk held that remedial constructive trusts are "deemed to have arisen at the time when the unjust enrichment first occurred". 24 Thus, remedial constructive trusts in Canada remain "remedial" in nature even though they invariably have retrospective effect. It might then be suggested that remedial constructive trusts should be confined to such "backdated" trusts, but this view causes even more confusion. Thus, Lord Neuberger has recently suggested that "remedial" constructive trusts which are of retrospective effect are in reality "imposed at once as an institutional trust". 25 Yet, confining "remedial" constructive trusts only to its prospective effect robs the trusts of much of their content. As Peter Birks has argued, such "trusts" amount to no more than mere orders for specific delivery of an asset, a jurisdiction already inherent in the common law.
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C. Senses of "Remedy"
A significant factor which influences one's definition of "institutional" and "remedial" constructive trusts is one's understanding of what a remedy entails. This is obvious from various judicial observations. For instance, the oft-quoted observation by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington L.B.C. states that "[a] remedial constructive trust … is a judicial remedy …"; 27 Nourse L.J. has defined a remedial constructive trust as "an order of the court granting, by way of a remedy, a proprietary right …"; 28 and Lewison J observed that remedial constructive trusts are situations where "the court will impose a constructive trust by way of a remedy".
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Given its centrality to the debate, it is curious that the meaning of "remedy" is left unexplained. It appears that "remedy" is used in this context simply to refer to the exercise of remedial discretion at the date of judgment, in contradistinction to a mere "declaration" of the claimant's pre-existing property right. However, this does not overcome the difficulties associated with the element of discretion, as discussed earlier. Moreover, Birks has explained that there are at least five possible meanings of the word "remedy", 30 and without identifying which of these is at play, it remains impossible properly to distinguish between institutional and remedial constructive trusts. In fact, without first identifying what a "remedy" means, there is a real possibility that the phrase "remedial constructive trusts" might even be taken to refer to legal devices that are not trusts at all. For example, in a recent paper by Bruce Collins Q.C., 31 that phrase was equated with a personal liability to account in the context of accessory liability, since, on one reading, a "remedy" is "nothing more 24 Rawluk v Rawluk [1990] than a formula for equitable relief". 32 As the Supreme Court has recently confirmed, however, accessory liability makes the defendant liable "as if he were a trustee", 33 whereas the subject matter at hand -constructive trusts -involve making the defendant a trustee properly so-called.
III. RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
In spite of their instability, the elements of discretion and timing persistently find themselves at the heart of the discussion. The tendency to focus on these elements reveals an underlying desire to understand the different sources of constructive trusts. It is suggested that a more precise and structured response to this desire is to explore how constructive trusts as remedies relate to the claimant's rights. 34 The term "remedy" is taken simply to refer to an order of the court, 35 which is "the core meaning of the term … most commonly expressly adopted by those who write on remedies." 36 On this understanding, a "constructive trust" is simply the subject matter of a court order, no more and no less. This leaves open the questions of what rights trigger the trusts and how the trusts relate to those rights. The answers to these questions require an analysis of how constructive trusts, as remedies, relate to the parties' rights and duties.
This section lays the groundwork for such an analysis by exploring the relationship between rights and remedies in private law.
A. Primary and Secondary Rights
While there are various ways in which private law remedies might be analysed, 37 one particularly powerful method is to understand whether and how remedies give effect to the claimant's substantive (primary or secondary) rights.
The distinction between primary and secondary rights was first made in English jurisprudence by John Austin in his lectures. According to Austin, primary rights are rights that exist "in and per se"; secondary rights "arise out of violations of primary rights". 38 Where A has a primary right against B, B owes a primary duty towards A which does not arise from a wrong. The primary right and duty make up a legal relationship between A and B which does not hinge on B committing a breach of a duty. On the other hand, when B commits a civil wrong by breaching a primary duty, 39 A obtains a secondary right against B. 
B. Types of Remedies
Replicative Remedies
When courts enforce A's primary right directly, the range of potential remedial responses is narrow and limited. 40 Discretion is neither exercised over the goal nor content of the awarded remedy, the former involving the making of policy choices which dictate the purpose or object of the remedy and the latter involving the selection of the manner of realising its goal. 41 The absence of such discretion reflects the fact that these remedies are logically restricted to compelling B to carry out his primary duty: it give A "the very thing to which he or she is entitled." 42 For instance, in actions for a contractual debt due 43 or actions by a beneficiary to hold a trustee liable to account for trust property, 44 courts are concerned solely with compelling the debtor or trustee to carry out his primary duty: the awarded remedy simply restates the parties' rights and duties as revealed in their contract or trust instrument. It also follows that B need not be shown to have breached the contract or trust, and issues of causation, remoteness, and mitigation of loss do not arise.
Given that they simply restate and replicate primary rights, remedies which enforce primary rights can be labelled "replicative" remedies. 45 
Reflective Remedies
To obtain a remedy which gives effect to A's secondary right, B's breach of duty is a necessary ingredient of the cause of action in question. Where B's breach causes A to suffer loss, issues of causation, remoteness and mitigation become relevant, 46 and A can be (and often is) awarded damages as a remedy. This can be seen, for instance, in actions for damages following a breach of contract 47 and actions against a trustee for negligently investing trust property. 48 The breach of contract or trust must be proved and shown to have caused a loss, and the breaching party will only be liable for losses which are not too remote.
In contrast to primary rights, secondary rights provide for a wider remedial potential 49 since, in principle, there is no logical restriction to the plethora of possible methods by which B's breach of his primary duty can be corrected. This is not to downplay the significance of the doctrine of precedent, which demands that like cases are to be treated alike, and which significantly diminishes the ability to reconsider an established precedent where the precedent was set by a higher court. But the doctrine of precedent applies regardless of the type of remedy in question. 50 The point presently made is that it is inherent in the nature of remedies which give effect to secondary rights that they have a remedial potential which is not as logically restricted as those giving effect to primary rights. It is sometimes thought that A does not obtain a secondary right from the moment B infringes A's primary right. For example, Stephen Smith writes that awards of damages do not confirm or affirm an existing duty to pay damages, but are created by court orders. 51 However, as Allan Beever has noted, the secondary "duty to repair" reflects a fundamental right: "[t]here is surely no remedy more basic than the repair of a wrong." 52 On the other hand, it is sometimes thought that remedies which give effect to secondary rights are indistinguishable from replicative remedies. For example, Rafal Zakrzewski says that an award of damages "redresses the non-performance of a secondary right to the payment of damages arising from a wrong", 53 and further, that a remedy which gives effect to secondary rights "simply restate[s] prior substantive rights". 54 However, it is doubtful whether it is ever possible for B properly to discharge his secondary duty prior to a court order, since B would not be in a position to determine what the appropriate liquidated sum of damages would be. Even if performance were attempted, this would not discharge the duty, since "pre-payment is no defence to a claim in damages". 55 Ultimately, a proper analysis calls for a nuanced approach by taking a middle ground between the two exaggerated views. The fact that a secondary right is created when B breaches A's primary right is not inconsistent with the view that that right already in existence requires liquidation by a court to determine the extent of the remedy, taking into account the criterion of remoteness.
56 This is reflected in the remedial discretion involved: such remedies allow for some discretion as to content to be exercised, but do not provide for the exercise of discretion to re-evaluate the goal of the remedy on a case-by-case basis. As John Gardner writes, "the secondary obligation is a rational echo of the primary obligation, for it exists to serve, so far as may still be done, the reasons for the primary obligation that was not performed when its performance was due." 57 In addition, as Paul Finn observes, there are doctrines which "suggest what is the goal of the remedy but leave it to the "appropriateness" principle to determine the manner of that goal's realisation". 58 So, although remedies which give effect to secondary rights provide for a wider remedial potential than replicative remedies, the "remedy is not at large." 59 215-16). But such "discretion" also applies regardless of the type of remedy in question, and so has no bearing on the present discussion concerning the nature of remedies. 51 56 The award of replicative remedies in certain contexts may also require an exercise of "liquidation", for instance where A's right to a contractual debt due is couched in terms of a "reasonable price" (see generally Rafal Zakrzewski, "The Nature of a Claim on an Indemnity" (2006) 22 J.C.L 54). But these cases are distinguishable from those presently discussed: these cases do not provide courts with any discretion as to the extent to which the defendant will be liable, since this is determined by the primary relationship between the parties and all that is left to do is to render certain the uncertain term. In particular, no assessment of the remoteness of loss or gain is necessary. 58 Finn, "Equitable Doctrine and Discretion in Remedies", p. 269. 59 Finn, "Equitable Doctrine and Discretion in Remedies", p. 270.
In order to reflect the fact that remedies which respond to secondary rights give effect to A's substantive right but nevertheless provide for the exercise of discretion as to content, they can be labelled "reflective" remedies.
Transformative Remedies
A third category of private law remedies, which can be labelled "transformative" remedies, provide for the widest remedial potential. Their imposition creates "a legal relation that significantly differs from any legal relation that existed before the court order was made".
60 They transform and substantially alter A's substantive rights.
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Examples of such remedies are an order giving guidance to trustees, 62 and a court's ability to allow the recovery of incurred expenses where a contract is discharged due to frustration "if it considers it just to do so having regard to all the circumstances of the case". 63 One can hardly say that beneficiaries have a substantive right to the particular guidance given to their trustees, or that a contracting party has a substantive right to the recovery of incurred expenses where the contract is frustrated.
The transformative nature of these remedies is brought to bear in their provision for the exercise of discretion as to both the goal and content of the appropriate remedy. Instead of merely replicating or liquidating A's pre-trial rights, the imposition of a transformative remedy requires "many of the policy choices that are entrenched in the law relating to substantive rights ... to be reopened."
64 It is therefore usually 65 difficult to predict in advance whether a transformative remedy will be awarded and (if it is) what its content would be. On the other hand, the flexibility of transformative remedies allows courts to respond to the sensitivities of the facts of a particular case.
IV. REPLICATIVE, REFLECTIVE, AND TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
Using the foregoing analytical framework of private law remedies, constructive trusts can be understood either as replicative, reflective, or transformative in nature. This section observes how a number of different constructive trust doctrines fit within this restructured understanding of remedies.
A. Replicative Constructive Trusts
The doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead 66 and secret trusts are examples of doctrines by which constructive trusts are imposed as replicative remedies. The former doctrine typically involves B informally agreeing to hold A's land on trust for A, and A acting in reliance by transferring the legal title of the land to B. The latter doctrine typically involves a testator (A) naming B as apparent legatee in A's will, with B informally agreeing to hold the legacy for the benefit of another (C), and A acting in reliance by leaving his will unchanged until his death. In both doctrines, once A acts in reliance on 60 Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, p. 203. 61 65 Again, the doctrine of precedent may constrain the exercise of such discretion in practice, but this does not detract from the fact that it is inherent in the nature of transformative remedies that they allow for discretion as to the goal and content of the remedy to be exercised. 66 B's promise by transferring the property which is the subject matter of the promise to B, a constructive trust arises for the benefit of the intended beneficiary when B acquires the property. It is under that trust that A (in the context of the Rochefoucauld doctrine) or C (in the secret trusts context) acquires the promised interest.
It is necessary briefly to consider and refute the suggestions some commentators have put forward that the constructive trust imposed in these doctrines is a "fiction", 67 and that the trusts enforced are in fact express in nature. 68 As a facilitative device, express trusts respond to A's properly manifested intention to create a trust. 69 In relation to the doctrines presently discussed, A's intention to create a trust is never properly manifested, usually due to the lack of compliance with certain formality requirements. 70 The express trusts analysis regrettably entails "disapplying" or ignoring the relevant statutory formality requirements. 71 On the other hand, a constructive trust analysis respects Parliament's sovereignty by leaving those provisions intact. 72 Furthermore, on the facts of some cases, none of the parties involved were able properly to declare an express trust; and so the trust enforced by the courts can only properly be analysed as constructive in nature. 73 It is unsurprising, therefore, that the position taken by the majority of commentators 74 and the overwhelming weight of authority 75 is that the trusts in question are constructive in nature. This analysis must be correct.
In these doctrines, the constructive trust remedy replicates A's primary right which arises from the moment B acquires the property. As replicative remedies, their award is not conditional upon B committing a wrong: "his trusteeship is independent of and precede[s] the breach of trust". 76 Thus, B incurs custodial duties 77 and a duty to account 78 from the moment of acquisition: B's "assumption to act ... itself" 79 gives rise to his liability to account for the trust property.
B. Reflective Constructive Trusts
An example of a doctrine providing for the imposition of reflective constructive trusts is proprietary estoppel. Proprietary estoppel arises where B induces A to assume (through a promise, assurance, or acquiescence in A's mistaken belief) that B will cede an interest in property he owns to A, and A detrimentally relies on the assumption. Guided by the notion of the "minimum equity to do justice to the plaintiff", 80 the imposed remedy aims to achieve proportionality between A's detriment and B's role in inducing it. 81 A constructive trust is often imposed, 82 but compensatory damages (or "equitable compensation") may also be awarded. 83 The availability of damages where B's breach causes a loss is a "sure test" 84 and a "powerful indicator" 85 that the remedy is wrongbased. After all, "'damages' means … a monetary award given for a wrong." 86 It follows that remedies awarded following a successful proprietary estoppel claim, whether in the form of a constructive trust or damages, give effect to A's secondary right. There must therefore be a causal link between B's promise or assurance and A's detriment, 87 which is established when A demonstrates the element of reliance. Rules of remoteness also come into play through the application of the "minimum equity" concept, which prevents B from being liable for any of A's detriment which is too remote.
In explaining the wrong-based analysis, Michael Spence defines the primary duty B breaches as a "duty to ensure the reliability of induced assumptions". 88 He writes: 89 The primary obligation is that This provides an explanation for why the elements of assurance or promise, reliance, and detriment are required. 90 When B induces A to assume that A will obtain an interest in B's property and A relies on that assumption, B incurs a primary duty to prevent harm to A by making good B's expectation. If, however, B refuses to do so, B breaches his primary duty, causing A to suffer detriment. A obtains an "equity by estoppel" against B, giving A a cause of action in proprietary estoppel. This "equity" requires liquidation by a court, following which a proprietary or personal remedy may be awarded. The "equity" is "capable of binding B's successors in title", 91 and thus if a constructive trust is determined to be the appropriate remedy, then the proprietary effect of such an award is backdated "by virtue of some doctrine of relation back" 92 to the time of B's breach.
C. Transformative Constructive Trusts
Commonwealth jurisdictions such as Australia and Canada have explicitly developed a "remedial constructive trust" device. This device allows for the award of transformative constructive trusts, which provides for the ability to exercise discretion both as to the goal and content of the appropriate remedy on a case-by-case basis.
Australia
In Australia, courts are able to impose "remedial constructive trusts" to prevent unconscionable conduct in a wide array of cases, such as those involving property acquired in the course of a de facto marriage, 93 estoppel, 94 breach of fiduciary duty, 95 and knowing receipt. 96 The imposition of these trusts unmistakably involves judicial discretion. It has repeatedly been said that the constructive trust is to be imposed only as a last resort, that is, after other "lesser" -personal -remedies have been considered and found to be wanting in a particular case. 97 This reflects an exercise of discretion as to the content of the appropriate remedy, akin to the "minimum equity" approach taken by English courts in relation to proprietary estoppel. Such discretion is also reflected in the ability of Australian courts to decide whether the trust will take effect from the date of judgment or from some other earlier point in time. 98 The extent of discretion does not stop there, however: courts go further by exercising discretion as to the goal of the remedy on a case-by-case basis. This is indicated by the open-ended list of potential purposes or objects pursuant to which these trusts may be awarded. For instance, "unconscionability" has been defined as a situation which the court deems to be "contrary to justice and good conscience". 99 This indicates that there is no limit to the potential objects for which the remedy may be awarded, so long as courts do not "disregard legal and equitable rights and simply do what is fair". 100 Similarly, while courts are guided by the "principle of appropriateness" whereby "the purpose (or imperatives) served by the individual doctrine" informs a judge in the selection of the appropriate remedy, 101 there is also "the requirement to do 'practical justice'", which allows courts to refuse to impose a constructive trust for any policy reason. For instance, a judge may be informed by concerns relating to the proportionality of the remedial response, 102 the protection of third party creditors who are "materially interested" or "directly affected" by the award, 103 or the desire to deter the defendant from keeping the proceeds of his wrongdoing. 104 As Deane J observed in Muschinski v Dodds, 105 the constructive trust may be "moulded and adjusted to give effect to the application and inter-play of equitable principles in the circumstances of the particular case." The clear ability to exercise discretion as to the goal of the appropriate remedy indicates that Australian courts impose constructive trusts as transformative remedies. 106 This conclusion is fortified by the rule adopted by the High Court in John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd. v White City Tennis Club Ltd. that "where a court is invited to make, or proposes to make, orders directly affecting the rights or liabilities of a non-party [such as a constructive trust], the non-party is a necessary party and ought to be joined." 107 Such third parties are able not only to make a case against the claimant's "substantive case", but also to argue that the award of a constructive trust remedy would unfairly prejudice them. In view of this rule, it is hardly possible to say that courts are concerned with replicating or reflecting a claimant's pre-existing right, since the decision whether or not to award a constructive trust hinges on factors which are extraneous to considerations relating to the claimant's rights.
Canada
Canadian courts have also developed a so-called "remedial constructive trusts" device, which is available in two types of claim, namely unjust enrichment and wrongdoing. Unjust enrichment claims are made out when three requirements are satisfied: the defendant received an enrichment, the claimant suffered a corresponding deprivation, and there is an absence of juristic reason for the enrichment which renders the defendant's retention of the enrichment unjust. 108 A wrongdoing claim is made out where the defendant is under an equitable obligation in relation to the activities giving rise to the assets in his hands, and it is shown that the assets were acquired as a result of the defendant's deemed or actual agency activities in breach of that obligation. 109 Such claims have arisen in cases relating to the acquisition of property by fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. 110 Once an unjust enrichment or wrongdoing claim is made out, courts have latitude to exercise discretion in order to determine the appropriate remedy. A "minimum equity"-like approach is detected, which indicates the exercise of discretion as to content. Thus, personal remedies must be deemed inadequate before a constructive trust can be awarded.
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In addition, however, courts also exercise discretion as to the goal of the appropriate remedy. Consider first the cases based on the defendant's wrongdoing. A constructive trust is awarded where the claimant can show a "legitimate reason for seeking a proprietary remedy", and where there are "no factors which would render imposition [sic] of a constructive trust unjust in all the circumstances of the case". 112 This indicates a non-exhaustive approach to the potentially relevant purposes or objectives to be achieved by the awarded remedy. Consider the case of Soulos v Korkontzilas, 113 which demonstrates the multifarious policy factors which may be taken into account. B was A's real estate broker, who in breach of his fiduciary duty arranged for his (B's) wife to purchase a property which B was meant to acquire on A's behalf. The majority of the Supreme Court held that a constructive trust was the appropriate remedy. In relation to the requirement to demonstrate a legitimate reason, this was fulfilled by the fact that the property in question held special value to A because the tenant was A's banker, and being the landlord of one's banker was prestigious in his community. 114 The award was also justified by the policy aim of "ensur[ing] that agents and others in positions of trust remain faithful to their duty of loyalty". 115 In relation to the requirement to demonstrate that the imposition of a constructive trust was not "unjust in all the circumstances of the case", the court took into account the fact that undue prejudice would not be caused either to B or to any third party.
116
The unjust enrichment cases also reveal an open-ended approach to the goal of the awarded remedy, where the constructive trust is used as "a broad and flexible equitable tool … to determine beneficial entitlement to property". 117 For a constructive trust to be imposed, it is necessary to show some "reason to grant to the plaintiff the additional rights that flow from recognition of a right of property"; 118 and it appears that any relevant policy factor can be taken into account. Among these are: the appropriateness of granting the claimant priority in bankruptcy, preventing the wrongdoer from retaining any increase in value of the property, the uniqueness of the property in question, the moral quality of the defendant's act, 119 the probability of the defendant paying up a personal award, 120 and the potential "psychological benefits derived from pride of ownership". 121 The discretion to determine the purpose or object of the remedy in a particular case indicates that these constructive trusts are transformative in nature.
V. A RE-ANALYSIS
A few exceptions notwithstanding, 122 judges have repeatedly held that English law recognises only "institutional" constructive trusts; it does not impose "remedial" constructive trusts. 123 By making this observation, these judges are not simply saying that English law approaches the award of constructive trusts differently from other Commonwealth jurisdictions. Rather, it reflects a much deeper concern, that it is unthinkable to award proprietary remedies through the exercise of judicial discretion and with retrospective effect. 124 To allow such a practice is thought to be unprincipled 125 and "without recourse to further rationalisation", 126 since only with the authority of Parliament can a court "grant a proprietary right to A, who has not had one beforehand, without taking some proprietary right away from B". 127 This reflects two assumptions concerning the imposition of constructive trusts in English law: they are ever only awarded where judges do not exercise discretion, 128 and that the retrospectivity in their award necessarily creates uncertainty in the law, 129 particularly to the prejudice of third parties.
It is crucial to explore whether these assumptions are valid. To do so meaningfully, it is necessary to proceed with an understanding of constructive trusts as replicative, reflective, or transformative remedies, in order to avoid the definitional difficulties in the current understanding, as discussed above. 130 
A. "Institutional" Constructive Trusts
Constructive trusts which have traditionally been identified as "institutional" in nature square easily with an understanding of these trusts as replicative remedies. In this regard, it can be noted that the constructive trusts which were earlier identified as replicative in nature -namely those arising in the context of the doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead and secret trusts -have also been described in terms which match those commonly used to identify institutional constructive trusts. Thus, as Millett L.J. (as he then was) observed of these constructive trusts, B's "possession of the property is coloured from the first by the trust and confidence by means of which he obtained it" 131 -that is, "as the result of a transaction by which both parties intend to create a trust from the outset". 132 There is a clear alignment between these constructive trusts and "institutional" constructive trusts, which are said to arise "by operation of law as from the date of the circumstances which give rise to it". 133 Moreover, the lack of exercise of remedial discretion in relation to "institutional" constructive trusts indicates the replicative nature of the trusts. Thus, in these doctrines, a constructive trust is invariably imposed, which indicates that the remedial response is narrow and limited. Because the remedy merely replicates the parties' primary rights and duties which have arisen pre-trial, judges never pause to consider whether a lesser remedy would be more appropriate.
B. "Remedial" Constructive Trusts
On the other hand, both reflective and transformative constructive trusts display characteristics of discretion and retrospectivity, and therefore they both map on to the present understanding of "remedial" constructive trusts.
As Reflective Remedies
Proprietary estoppel allows judges to exercise remedial discretion to give effect to A's secondary right, by which a backdated constructive trust might be imposed. Hence, this doctrine can be understood as providing for the imposition of "remedial" constructive trusts. As Etherton J. (as he then was) observed, proprietary estoppel provides for the imposition of: 134 a constructive trust by way of discretionary ... relief, the right to which is a mere equity prior to judgment, but which will have priority over intervening rights of third parties on established principles, such as those relating to notice, volunteers and the unconscionability on the facts of a claim by the third party to priority.
These constructive trusts are, however, distinct from those imposed as replicative or transformative remedies. Unlike replicative constructive trust doctrines where B must always perform his promise because he is invariably bound to honour his pre-existing trust relationship with A, here it is less obvious that B should be compelled to carry out the entirety of his promise whenever A suffers a reliance loss. There can be various degrees of detriment suffered and expectations formed; and "[i]t is clear … that these elements are fact sensitive and hugely dependent on the context". 135 The exercise of discretion is therefore essential. At the same time, they are distinct from those awarded as transformative remedies. It is clear that the fundamental object of proprietary estoppel is the correction of reliance losses, 136 or "harm", as Spence calls it. By "seek[ing] to react to multiple considerations", 137 proprietary estoppel provides for the exercise of remedial discretion in order to tailor the content of the remedy to achieve the goal of compensation. Hence, unlike transformative constructive trusts, discretion is not exercised as to the goal of the remedy.
As Transformative Remedies
As a remedy which significantly transforms A's pre-trial rights, the "remedial constructive trust" device as developed in Commonwealth jurisdictions such as Australia and Canada allows for the exercise of discretion which goes beyond that provided for under English law. The ability to exercise discretion both as to the goal and content of the appropriate remedy indicates that courts are concerned with the redistribution of property rights to reflect various policy aims. Hence, this device can potentially be imposed in any case and "whatever the field of private law involved". 138 taken to suggest that transformative constructive trusts have a place in English law. The first is based on the observations that the "remedial constructive trust" device as developed in those Commonwealth jurisdictions may have the object of attaining "the minimum equity to grant a proprietary remedy" 139 or achieving "fairness or good conscience". 140 It might be argued that, if either of these serves as the fixed "goal" of the remedy, then discretion as to goal is not after all exercised, which leads to the conclusion that the "remedial constructive trust" device is, after all, imposed as reflective remedies in reality.
Such a view ought to be resisted. It is first necessary to recall that the "minimum equity" approach, on its own, indicates that discretion is exercised only as to content and not as to goal. It dictates that equity's intervention ought to be the least invasive possible to achieve a particular goal; it says nothing about what goal ought to be achieved. So, for example, a "minimum equity" approach might be taken in pursuit of the goal of punishment, or compensation, or equitable redistribution of property rights: the choice of the goal remains at the courts' discretion. Similarly, "fairness" and "good conscience" are not precise enough to act as the goal of the appropriate remedy. This is easily demonstrated by the fact that any court order aims to do justice, to achieve fairness, and to accord with good conscience; it leaves open the particular purpose(s) or object(s) for which a transformative constructive trust is imposed.
The second type of observation suggests that all constructive trusts are in fact remedial in nature, and therefore there is nothing unique about replicative constructive trusts, since even these can be recast as transformative in nature. For example, Keith Mason writing extra-judicially observes that, even where events trigger the availability of (replicative) constructive trusts, "a stern drill-sergeant roars out 'WAIT FOR IT' … A full-blown proprietary remedy will only be granted if truly necessary and appropriate." 141 Similarly, R.P. Austin writes that "a proprietary remedy should not ever be regarded as mandatory. It should be possible for a court to exercise discretion against decreeing proprietary relief if the circumstances suggest that it would be unwise to do so." 142 Along the same vein, Michael Bryan suggests that "the alternative of ordering personal relief must always be considered, and choice exercised according to flexible but structured criteria." 143 It would be a distortion of the law to deconstruct constructive trusts in this way. Whatever the historical position may have been, 144 it is an accurate observation of the modern law that no discretion as to goal and content is exercised in relation to the award of replicative constructive trusts. The fact that the law deems the parties' primary rights and duties as worthy of being enforced negates the need for courts to exercise discretion as to the goal of the remedy, and the content of the remedy is determined simply by direct reference to those rights and duties. Allowing even a residual possibility of considering afresh the goal and content of replicative constructive trusts on a case-bycase basis is not only unnecessary, but is also liable to cause contradictions and confusion. Moreover, it would detract from the full meaning of having rights at law. Since courts are prepared to say, in the context of the doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead and secret trusts, that informally declared trusts will be enforced as constructive trusts, then beneficiaries under such trusts have rights enforceable as against their trustees which are similar in this respect to rights of beneficiaries under express trusts. To hold that courts may yet exercise discretion to deprive beneficiaries under such constructive trusts of their rights would suggest that courts may also do so in relation to beneficiaries under any trust. This would in turn cast doubt as to whether beneficiaries have rights at all.
Evaluation
Because the present understanding of "remedial" constructive trusts does not take into account the distinction between reflective and transformative constructive trusts, this leads to the unfortunate exaggeration that "remedial constructive trust[s are] not part of English law". 145 The source of the problem is an exaggerated notion of remedial discretion, which fails to recognise that different degrees and dimensions of discretion are exercised in relation to "remedial" constructive trusts. It has been explained that reflective remedies provide for the exercise of discretion as to content, while transformative remedies allow for the exercise of discretion as to both content and goal. The former gives effect to secondary rights, while the latter has little to do with preexisting substantive rights. Once this distinction is appreciated, then it becomes clear that it is transformative constructive trusts which are not part of English law.
It is obvious that the imposition of transformative constructive trusts is far more contentious than the imposition of reflective constructive trusts, since the former has the potential of leading to the unbridled exercise of judicial discretion. This is not an issue in relation to reflective constructive trusts because the exercise of discretion is constrained in terms of the goal of the remedy. Thus, although proprietary estoppel provides for the exercise of remedial discretion, its exercise is constrained by the remedial goal of compensating A for harm suffered through the unreliability of B's induced assumptions. This is why the exercise of discretion and the retrospective effect of a constructive trust award do not cause any uncertainty in this doctrine: it is precisely because proprietary estoppel remedies give effect to the claimant's substantive rights that we can confidently state the choices and constraints on the courts' exercise of discretion, as well as predict with reasonable certainty the possible outcome of any particular case. This also explains why it is demonstrably untrue that the ability to vary proprietary rights can only be granted by an Act of Parliament: as proprietary estoppel indicates, English courts are able to do so in a controlled manner, that is, where the exercise of discretion is constrained as to the goal of the remedy.
VI. THE WAY FORWARD
It remains to be considered what implications this restructured understanding has for the future development of the law. In the first place, it refines the nub of what really troubles English judges. It has been seen that the presence of remedial discretion and retrospectivity in the award of constructive trusts does not necessarily cause uncertainty or reflect a lack of proper principle. Instead, the nub of the concern seems to be the ability to exercise unconstrained or unbridled discretion. English courts are perfectly comfortable with exercising remedial discretion where the goal of the remedy constrains the exercise of such discretion, as proprietary estoppel indicates, but not where the discretion is "at large".
